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Abstract: This paper argues that there is no country in Latin America where we can
confidently say that income inequality improved during the 1990s. We document this fact
for the 15 countries where comparable household surveys, covering most of the
population, are available. What we observe are genuine distributive changes, which are
being driven neither by differences in the characteristics of the data nor by the way in
which the data is treated. In 10 of the countries, the lack of progress is driven by
increases in inequality among the first nine deciles. In the remaining 5, the reason is a
greater concentration among the richest 10% of the population. We also observe that in 7
countries, the dynamics among individuals with 14 years or more of schooling are the
main reason why income distribution has not improved in the 1990s. However, the lack
of progress in income distribution is not exclusive to this region. We compare Latin
America internationally and find that, with few exceptions, inequality has increased less
in this region than in developed countries and in Eastern Europe.
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Introduction
This paper argues that there is no country in Latin America where we can confidently say
that income inequality improved during the 1990s. Apart from documenting this fact by
using household survey data for the 15 countries in the region with information
representative at the national level,
1 we pursue two other objectives. First, we verify if
what we observe are genuine distributive changes, or if they are being driven by
differences in the characteristics of the data or by the way in which the data is treated.
Secondly, we explore what kinds of individuals and what kinds of incomes are driving
the shifts that have taken place.
Studying the Latin American case is especially relevant for at least three reasons. The
first is that it is the most unequal region in the world, and the changes in the 1990s give
some indication of prospects for the future. The second is that the 1990s have been years
of economic recovery and macro stability, as compared to the “lost decade” of the 1980s,
which was characterized by high economic volatility and stagnation, and by a sharp
deterioration in income distribution. Macroeconomic volatility and inflation usually have
larger negative effects on the poor, but it is still not clear if a more stable environment
leads to reductions in inequality or simply to a deceleration or an end  of the
deterioration.
2 Latin America is a good case to verify if there is a tendency for income
distribution to improve after adverse macro conditions. This is important in light of the
recent financial turmoil in East Asia, and of the unstable macroeconomic environment in
several Eastern European countries.
 One of the best examples of why stable economic
conditions do not necessarily imply improvements in the distribution is inflation. It is
well known that high inflation rates affect the poor more because they do not have access
to income smoothing mechanisms and because their incomes are more closely tied to
minimum wages, which tend to deteriorate in these conditions. However, if inflation is
                                                       
1 As explained later, the only exception is Uruguay, where surveys cover around 90% of the total
population in the country.
2 There is a large list of works documenting deterioration in the distribution of income during recession,
volatility and stabilization. One recent example is the collection of country studies in Ganuza, Taylor and
Morley (1998).5
controlled, this normally means that the additional pressure on inequality will be released.
Inequality will not continue to grow, but there is no reason to expect that it will decline.
The third reason is that during the 1980s the Latin American economies initiated an
intense process of economic reform.
3 These kinds of measures imply an intense
reallocation of resources in the economy that is likely to have short-term and longer-term
effects over income distribution. Since several Eastern European economies are going
through the initial phases of the same process at the moment, it is of interest to know if
there is a tendency for distribution to improve or worsen during or right after the
implementation of reform.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 documents the changes in inequality in
Latin America in the 1990s by using 49 household surveys from 15 countries, and
compares them with changes in countries of other regions in the world in recent years. In
all cases inequality is estimated directly with the micro data from household surveys.
Section 2 verifies if our impression about the changes in inequality is modified when
accounting for differences in geographic and income source coverage. Section 3 checks
for the robustness of the changes to the use of different assumptions about adult
equivalence scales, economies of scale in consumption, treatment of missing and zero
values, and the use of alternative inequality measures. Section 4 explores what’s behind
the changes, but still with the sole idea of illustrating what aspects of distribution have
been changing, rather than explaining the causes of the shifts. Section 5 concludes.
1. Changes in Inequality in the 1990s
To explore the dynamics of income distribution in Latin America in the 1990s we process
the micro data in 49 household surveys for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay
                                                       
3 See IADB (1997).6
and Venezuela.
4 These countries cover 90% of the total population in Latin America (see
Appendix tables A.1 and A.2 for a description of the data), and to our knowledge they
constitute the most comprehensive and up-to-date comparison for the Latin American
region for the 1990s. The specific countries and years analyzed are selected under two
criteria. The first is that the countries should have surveys that are nationally
representative. The only exception we make is Uruguay, where household surveys are
restricted to urban areas but still include more than 90% of the country’s population.
We apply this strong restriction to assure that a sufficiently large proportion of the
population is covered. Focusing on the urban distribution due to the lack of national data
in countries with large rural populations may give a misleading impression  of the
direction and the size of a distributive shift.
5 Restricting the analysis to nationally
representative information also guarantees that composition effects due to migration do
not drive the changes we observe. By imposing this restriction, the number of data points
we are left with is considerably reduced since countries with a long tradition of producing
household surveys (to which we have access) are left out. One notable case is Argentina,
where most of the surveys for the 1990s refer only to Gran Buenos Aires, or at best to
other urban areas, but typically cover less than 70% of the population of the country. In
some cases this restriction considerably shortens the period we are able to analyze. For
instance, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador and Paraguay have long series of urban surveys,
but since they cover less than 50% of the total population the observations for those years
have also been excluded from this study. Thus, for these countries, we restrict the
comparison only to the years where a nationally representative survey is available to us.
The second and most important requirement is that the series of household surveys for the
1990s be strictly comparable within each country in terms of questionnaires, sampling
techniques, and institutional origin.
6 We do this to guarantee that what we observe are
                                                       
4 Some of these surveys where obtained through MECOVI, a program sponsored by the Inter American
Development Bank, the World Bank, and ECLAC to collect and organize the existing household surveys in
Latin America and to promote the implementation of new surveys. The rest of the surveys were obtained
directly through country statistical offices.
5 We illustrate this in Section 2.
6 For a recent discussion of the importance of these aspects for comparisons over time, see Pyatt (1999).7
genuine distributive changes and not shifts caused by differences in the way in which the
data is produced. For instance, in the case of Venezuela, household surveys are available
for each year since 1990. We only use two of those surveys because the questionnaire and
the instruments used to capture the information changed in 1994. Thus, the only surveys
that are strictly comparable are those held either before 1994 or from 1995 on.
7 This
restriction also implies dropping the Dominican Republic from our sample. This country
has surveys for 1992 and 1996, but since the surveys have different objectives and
questionnaires we do not consider them.
8
It is important to bear in mind that with these two strong restrictions we guarantee
comparability within the countries included in the study, but cross-country comparability
is not guaranteed. Some of the differences become apparent in the following sections.
9
Our 49 observations for Latin America are plotted in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
10 In Figure 1 we
present the 8 cases where there is a statistically significant increase in the Gini coefficient
between the first and last observation. The largest increases between the two end-points
are observed in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela.
11 Among the countries with
                                                       
7 The exceptions we make are one survey for Peru and two surveys for Honduras. The 1991, 1994 and 1997
Peruvian surveys are nationally representative, but the 1991 survey excludes the geographic areas of Costa
Rural, Selva Urbana and Selva Rural, which account for 16% and 18% of the total population in 1994 and
1997, respectively. Throughout this work, we do not restrict the 1994 and 1997 samples to the same
geographic areas as 1991 mainly because of the loss of information that this conveys. However, we check if
our conclusions about the changes in inequality in Peru are modified when restricting the last two surveys
to the geographic areas covered in 1991, but none of them is modified. In fact, the  Gini coefficient
computed with and without these geographic areas in 1994 and 1997 is not statistically significantly
different from the Gini for the whole population. In the case of Honduras, the first three surveys we use are
strictly comparable. The 1998 survey is identical except for the fact that it includes additional questions in
the questionnaire to capture non-labor incomes. We have used the four surveys for our analysis and in
Section 2 we show that the conclusions about the changes in inequality in this country hold when we only
use the incomes that are strictly comparable throughout.
8 The 1992 data is from a consumption survey, while the 1996 data is from a labor force survey. The
income sources covered, the timing, the sampling technique and the objectives of each are different. We do
not know if, when they are compared, the differences reflect real changes in inequality or if they are only
reflecting differences in the way in which the data is produced.
9 Székely and Hilgert (1999) present a detailed discussion of the differences across countries.
10 We end up with 5 observations for Colombia, and Costa Rica, 4 for Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, and
Uruguay, 3 for El Salvador, Panama and Peru, and 2 for Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and
Venezuela.
11 As mentioned previously, national household surveys for Venezuela are available for years previous to
1995. We have not used this information here because the data is not comparable with the surveys for 1995
and 1997 (the main difference is the change in the questionnaire), although we do have access to household8
more than two observations, we distinguish three patterns. First, in El Salvador, Panama
and Peru inequality grows continuously throughout the period. Secondly, in Brazil and
Uruguay, most of the deterioration took place during the early years of the decade.
Thirdly, in Honduras there was a reduction in the early years of the decade, and a sharp
deterioration thereafter.
Figure 2 presents the 6 countries where there is no statistically significant change in the
Gini coefficient between the two end points of the 1990s. They are Bolivia (where the
comparison is only available for 1996 and 1997), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador
and Mexico. Colombia and Chile are the only cases where the Gini shows some variation
between the first and last observation. In Colombia there is a considerable increase in
inequality between 1991 and 1993, and then a decline that fully compensates for the
deterioration. In Chile there is a decline between 1990 and 1992, which is fully
compensated by an increase in 1994 and 1996.
In Figure 3 we include Paraguay, which is apparently the only country where inequality
declined (the figure has the same scales to facilitate the comparison). The solid line in the
figure shows that that there is a substantial reduction in the Gini coefficient (of about 5
points) between 1995 and 1998. We present this country separately not only because it is
apparently the only one where inequality decreased, but also because the 1995 survey,
although comparable with 1998, is quite peculiar. As shown by  Székely and  Hilgert
(1999), the high value of the Gini coefficient for 1995, which actually places the country
as one of the most unequal in the world, is totally driven by a single outlier observation
(out of a sample of around 22,000) with an income of US$132,000 per month. This is an
implausibly high figure for Paraguay, and it is actually the highest income captured by
any of the household surveys in the 18 Latin American and the Caribbean countries with
available data. The second highest income in the survey is eleven times smaller. Figure 4
plots all the incomes of the 1995 and 1998 surveys (in real terms and in the same scale)
                                                                                                                                                                    
surveys for Venezuela for 1989 and 1993. The Gini indexes computed from those data are .44 and .43,
respectively. Including them in the picture would lead to the conclusion that inequality in this country
increased by even more than is apparent in Figure 1, but this conclusion should be taken cautiously because
the surveys are not strictly comparable.9
and illustrates more clearly the degree to which this observation is an outlier. As
explained by Cowell and Victoria Feser (1996), these kinds of observations are normally
regarded as “contamination” in the data and in the literature for developed countries it is
standard practice to eliminate them from the sample. The dotted line in Figure 3 presents
the change in the Gini coefficient after excluding the highest observation in both years,
and shows that our impression about the change in inequality in Paraguay between 1995
and 1998 is totally driven by this single outlier in 1995. After excluding the top
observation from each sample, there is no statistically significant change between 1995
and 1998.
Therefore, we can confidently say that none of the 15 Latin American countries examined
here show distributive progress in the 1990s. In the only case where there is an apparent
improvement, the conclusion depends on a single outlier observation that is not very
reliable, and which perhaps is better described as “contamination” in the data.
 12
Comparisons with Previous Decades
In a recent paper, Londoño and Székely (2000) (LS) show that the Gini index in Brazil,
Honduras, Panama, Peru and Venezuela increased during the 1980s. According to our
results, the 1990s have experienced a continuation of this trend, although there seems to
                                                       
12 To our knowledge, the only two other works examining changes in inequality in a number of Latin
American countries in the 1990s are Wodon et al. (1999) and ECLAC (1998). Wodon et al. use household
survey data for 12 countries, but five of them have only urban coverage and large rural populations. The
other two (the Dominican Republic and Venezuela) have data representative at the national level, but the
series of surveys are not strictly comparable over time. The six countries where the authors use the same
data as ourselves are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay. The trend observed in the
aforementioned study for these countries is very similar to our results. Nevertheless, the conclusions on the
changes during the 1990s are not exactly the same as in this study for the cases of Honduras, Colombia and
Uruguay, but this is only because Wodon et al. cover a shorter time-span (their analysis stops in 1996 for
these countries), and do not consider the shifts observed up to 1997 or 1998, which are quite important,
especially for Honduras and Uruguay. Comparisons with the ECLAC study are more difficult for four
reasons. First, ECLAC only reports income distribution measures for urban and rural areas separately, so it
is not possible to draw conclusions about the evolution of inequality at the national level. Second, the study
does not specify which household surveys were used for the computations, so we do not know whether the
information is comparable over time within each country. Third, the methodology, and in particular, the
adjustments to National Accounts, are not explained or documented, so we do not know if there is
comparability even between the  Gini for urban areas they present and  those presented later in this
document. Fourth, for Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay, the results refer only to large metropolitan areas
that do not cover the whole urban population.10
be a slight deceleration in the deterioration.
13  Londoño and  Székely only consider
countries with surveys in the 1980s that are nationally representative, so they do not
include information for El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, which also appear in
Figure 1. However, for Uruguay we do have a previous survey for 1981 with the same
geographic coverage as the later surveys. We compute the Gini coefficient for this year
and find that inequality declined from .4329 in 1981 to .4064 in 1989. According to our
calculations, the Gini index for Uruguay for 1997 is .43, so the slight improvement in the
1980s in this country seems to have ended during the present decade.
With respect to the countries in Figure 2, Londoño and Székely show that there was a
sharp increase in inequality during the 1980s in Mexico and Chile. In the 1990s,
inequality has remained at practically the same high level in these countries. Colombia
and Costa Rica are the only countries in our sample where Londoño and Székely show
that the Gini coefficient declined during the 1980s. During the 1990s, distribution has not
continued to improve in any of these cases.
Comparisons with Countries in Other Regions
To place these changes in a wider context, we access household survey data from the
Luxembourg Income Study for two points in time for 17 countries from outside the Latin
American region, as well as several Socio-Economic Surveys for Thailand. We do this to
verify whether the lack of distributive progress in the 1990s is exclusive to the Latin
American region or if it is a more widespread phenomenon. Table 1 presents the results
and includes the change between the first and last survey for each of the Latin American
countries in our sample.
14 The Gini coefficients refer to the distribution of household per
capita income.
                                                       
13 Strict comparability between the Londoño and Székely country estimates and those presented here is not
guaranteed, even though they all refer to countries with nationally representative surveys. Thus, these
comparisons should be taken cautiously.
14 Note that the comparison does not refer to the same years for each country. Note also that the last year in
the comparison for the Latin American countries is generally closer to 1998 than in the other regions. To
make the Gini coefficients more comparable, we compute inequality in the non-Latin American countries
by using the full sample of individuals (excluding domestic servants and boarders), but we drop missing
and zero values. In Table 1 we use income, rather than consumption, because most surveys report only11
Of the 32 countries in the table, there is only one case (Thailand) where there is a
statistically significant reduction in the Gini index in the 1990s. On average, the smallest
yearly increase is actually observed in the group of countries comprised by Latin
America. They are followed by North America (note, however, that the change in the
United States is much greater than in Canada) and Western Europe. Eastern Europe is the
region with the sharpest deterioration.
With respect to individual countries, the largest yearly increases (in  Gini points) are
registered in El Salvador (0.018), Poland (.017 points), Hungary (.015), Venezuela (.013)
and Italy (.013 points). With the exception of El Salvador and Venezuela, the increase in
the rest of the Latin American countries does not deviate considerably from the pattern in
countries found outside the region. In fact, for most Latin American countries, the yearly
change in inequality during the 1990s has been smaller than in the US.
It should be noted that the Eastern European countries that register the largest increases in
inequality are still going through a period of economic liberalization and macroeconomic
instability, which is similar to the macro context during the second half of the 1980s in
Latin America. In contrast, the latest observations for Taiwan and Thailand are several
years before the recent financial crisis in East Asia. Therefore, we are comparing changes
in inequality post-crisis and during reform in Latin America, with inequality during crisis
in Eastern Europe, with inequality pre-crisis in East Asia, and with inequality during
mild, but positive, growth in industrial countries. More recent data for South East Asia
and Eastern Europe would perhaps change this picture.
                                                                                                                                                                    
income. For a more detailed analysis of changes in inequality in developed and Eastern European countries,
see Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998).12
2. Changes in Inequality and Survey Characteristics
Results such as those presented in Figures 1 to 3 are commonly used to evaluate
economic performance and may influence our impression about the effectiveness of the
policies that countries pursue. Usually, countries where income distribution improves
over time are regarded as successful, while the contrary occurs for countries where
inequality increases. In this section we explore whether, even after restricting the sample
of countries to those that have strictly comparable surveys, differences in survey
characteristics or some other aspects of the surveys are driving the changes we observe
across countries.
First, we turn to changes within each country. Even though the Gini indexes in the first
column of Table 2 are computed from household surveys that are strictly comparable
over time, the sample from which they are drawn can change in subtle ways, thereby
distorting the picture of the changes in inequality. For instance, even though the survey
questionnaire is strictly comparable, there may be changes in the sampling frame that
modify the weight of some population groups, and therefore modify the value of the Gini
coefficient even if there is no real distributive shift. Appendix Table A.2 shows the
census used as the frame for the design of each of the surveys. In most cases, the frame is
the same for all observations, but in Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru, it changes in
some years. In Mexico it actually changes twice. In all these cases the difference is in the
first years considered, so any conclusion driven by the early part of the decade should be
taken with more caution.
A related issue is the size of the sample in each survey. On the one hand, larger samples
improve the precision of any estimate, and on the other, by increasing population
coverage, they might include a wider variety of socioeconomic groups. Since
improvements in terms of the precision or in the increases in coverage do not have any
clear effect on inequality estimates, we can do little more than document them. Table A.2
in the Appendix presents the sample sizes as well as the standard error of each13
observation and shows that in Chile, Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador, Uruguay, and
Venezuela there are considerable shifts in some years.
With respect to differences in survey characteristics across countries, the two most
important issues are income source and geographic coverage. We now turn to assess their
importance.
Differences in Income Source Coverage
One of the main differences across countries is the degree to which household surveys
capture the range of possible income sources. The most complete surveys capture non-
monetary incomes, labor incomes, income from capital, government transfers, property
rents, and other incomes. As shown in Appendix Table A.2, most surveys capture some
non-labor incomes, but it is common to capture these sources through a single question in
the questionnaires rather than gathering information on each of them separately. This
difference undoubtedly reduces the precision of the estimation of non-labor incomes. It
can also be seen that there are important differences in the coverage of non-monetary
incomes.
Table 2 presents in the first column the Gini coefficient estimated in a conventional way
for Latin America – that is, using per capita income and dropping all zero and missing
values – with the most complete definition available in each case (these are the
observations plotted in Figures 1 to 3). The second column presents the Gini for labor
incomes, including labor income from self-employment. This is the income source with
the highest degree of comparability across countries and over time. If we restrict our
comparison to this source, we would conclude that in 11 cases inequality increased
during the 1990s (comparing the first and last points). In Bolivia, Costa Rica and
Ecuador, the change is not statistically significant. Paraguay is the only country where
there is a reduction, but, as shown in Figure 4, this conclusion is totally driven by a single
outlier observation in the survey.14
Therefore, if we restrict the Gini coefficient to measure inequality by using the same
comparable income sources in all cases, some conclusions change. Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico, which apparently have a better record in terms of income distribution in the
1990s, now appear to have significant increases in inequality, even similar to those
observed in Honduras and Nicaragua. The reason why the first three countries at first
glance have a better record than the last two is simply that their household surveys cover
other income concepts that apparently have been better distributed than labor incomes.
Differences in Geographic Coverage
Since our sample of countries  includes one where the surveys are not nationally
representative, it is also of interest to compare the change in urban areas only, which is
the only way of guaranteeing geographic comparability. The last columns of Table 2
present the Gini for urban and rural areas separately, as well as the relation between the
average urban and rural incomes, and the proportion of urban population.
15 According to
the results, there are several cases where our impression  of the change in inequality
would be modified by restricting the samples to urban areas. In Bolivia, Chile, and
Colombia, urban inequality increases during the 1990s, while in Costa Rica, Ecuador and
Mexico urban inequality declines between the first and last observation. Interestingly,
these are the six countries where there was no statistically significant change in the Gini
coefficient for the whole population. Thus, the conclusions change if we restrict  our
comparison to the same geographic areas for all 15 countries. Most importantly, this
comparison reveals that in countries where the rural population is relatively large (see the
last column of the table), focusing only on urban areas, due to the lack of national
household surveys, can give a totally misleading impression  of how inequality has
changed.
                                                       
15 We present the data in this way, rather than through the traditional decomposition of the change in
inequality into between and within group effects (by using members of the General Entropy family of
inequality measures), because our objective is to determine whether our impression of the change in
inequality depends on the geographic area that the surveys cover. For Venezuela 1997, we do not have
access to the variable indicating the geographic location of each observation. For this reason we do not
separate the data.15
The differences between total inequality and urban inequality are the effects of the
disparities within rural areas and the effect of differences between the average incomes of
these two areas. Rural inequality increased in 7 out of the 13 cases where the comparison
can be made. In Chile, Colombia and Paraguay it declined, and it remained practically
unchanged in Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama. Differences between urban and rural
areas have also changed quite significantly (see Table 2). In Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras
and Peru they had an inequality-reducing effect, while in Chile, Colombia, El Salvador,
Mexico and Paraguay, they had the opposite impact. Restricting the comparison to urban
populations ignores these important effects on distribution.
3. Do the Conclusions Survive Some Robustness Tests?
The Gini indexes in Figures 1 to 3 are computed by using income per capita as the
welfare indicator and by dropping all missing and zero incomes. This is equivalent to
assuming that there are no economies of scale in consumption, that each individual in the
household has the same needs, and that all missing and zero values are unreliable
observations and should be discarded. Although this is the standard way in which
inequality estimates are computed in Latin America,
16 there are equally valid alternative
assumptions that could be used. In this section we check whether our conclusions depend
on the specific methodological choices used so far. We also explore if the conclusions are
robust to the choice of other inequality indexes.
3.1 Economies of Scale and Adult Equivalence Scales
As argued by Lanjow and Ravallion (1995), the assumption that there are no economies
of scale in consumption is unrealistic because when an additional member joins the
household it is not necessary to duplicate many of the basic expenditures, such as
infrastructure. There can even be economies of scale in food production and
                                                       
16 Londoño and Székely (2000).16
consumption. Income per capita is computed by dividing total income (y) over the
number of individuals in the household (n), but it can also be expressed as y/n
a, where a
is a parameter indicating the extent to which there are economies of scale. Per capita
income is obtained when a=1.
Unfortunately, there is no convincing theoretical argument to decide what the value of a
should be within different contexts. One option, which we pursue here, is to define a
range of values for the parameter, with which the sensitivity to the particular choice can
be verified. For the purposes of this work, we choose four values for a:.975, .95, .925
and .9, which still imply rather conservative assumptions about economies of scale. If we
assume the most extreme of these values, a=.9, a household of 5 members (the average
in Latin America) is equivalent to a household size of 4.2 individuals. This yields a
greater income for each member as compared to the assumption that a=1.
The first column in Table 3 presents the Gini index calculated using a=.9 (we do not
present the results using other values of the parameter for brevity and because they show
smaller variation).  There are four countries where our conclusions change when we
allow for economies of scale in consumption. In Chile and Ecuador inequality increases
rather than remaining constant, although the shift is only statistically significant in Chile.
In Uruguay, rather than an increase, there is no statistically significant change, while in
Costa Rica inequality declines rather than remaining constant. For the rest of the
countries, our conclusions remain unchanged when using the range of parameters
mentioned above.
Apart from the possible existence of economies of scale, it is normally argued that
different individuals have different needs. For instance, in the analysis of income
distribution in developed countries, equivalence scales are widely used to adjust for
differences in needs by age.
17 In Latin America, the use of equivalence scales has been
much more limited mainly because adequate estimates are not readily available. To check
for the robustness of the results to adjusting the data for differences in needs, we use two17
equivalence scales. The first is the “Amsterdam” scale in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
which has been widely used in developed countries, and the second is a recent scale
estimated by Contreras (1996) with data from Chile. The second column in Table 3
presents the results using the equivalence scale by Contreras, which is the one under
which the Gini presents greater variation.
 18
If, rather than focusing on the conventional Gini, we allow for the use of equivalence
scales, our conclusions from Section 1 change only marginally. In Ecuador there is a
slight increase, rather than a stable Gini, while in Mexico there is a slight decline instead
of no change.
3.2 Treatment of Missing and Zero Values
So far we have dropped missing and zero incomes from the sample. In the few countries
that document how these cases are handled, most proceed in the same way.
19 Usually the
justification for doing so is that these observations are unreliable and introduce more
noise than signal into the measurement of inequality. According to  Juster and Smith
(1998) missing values tend to be correlated with capital incomes, and are generally due to
the reluctance of the rich to disclose their wealth. In the case of zero incomes, it is not
quite clear if they are associated with specific income sources, income levels  and
socioeconomic characteristics, or if they represent a precise and reliable answer to survey
questions at all.  This is a potentially important issue in Latin America because, as shown
in Table 3, the proportion of missing and zero incomes varies not only across countries,
but also within the same country in many cases. The only countries where they are
negligible are Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. But in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Bolivia and El
Salvador they account for more than 10% of the observations in the whole household
survey for some years.
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 See, for instance, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).
18 This equivalence scale is taken from Ferreira and Litchfield (1997), who adjust the original scale by
Contreras. For the typical 5-member household in Latin America, applying the Contreras equivalence scale
implies reducing household size from 5 to 3.5.
19 Londono and Székely (2000).18
Excluding zero and missing values from the computation of the Gini is, however, only
one among several options. We may also choose to believe that individuals reporting zero
income are providing reliable information or, alternatively, we can impute incomes for
zero income respondents rather than discarding them. For the purposes of this work we
tried several combinations of dropping and imputing missing and zero values one at a
time. The option under which  the greatest variation was identified is the case where
missing values are imputed and zero incomes are taken at their face value. For the
imputations we follow a two-step procedure. The first step consists of estimating income
regressions for each income source separately, where each individual’s income is the
dependent variable, and the independent variables are all personal and household
characteristics. The coefficients are used to predict each income-earner’s income for that
source, including non-respondents. The second step consists of ranking all income
earners of the source in question (including non-respondents) according to their predicted
income. For non-responses, the error term is calculated by averaging the residual of the
observation immediately above and below, and the total imputed income corresponds to
the predicted plus the estimated residual. Household incomes are added up after the
procedure.
20
The fourth column of Table 3 presents the Gini coefficient for each year by treating
missing and zero incomes in the way just described. The results are quite striking. Now,
instead of having 8 countries with a statistically significant change in inequality during
the 1990s, we have 10 cases. We now have 5 countries where the shift is not significant,
but the countries in this group are very different from those in Figure 2. Finally, there is
not  even  one case, including Paraguay, where inequality appears to decline in a
statistically significant manner. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador are the countries
where the pattern is modified from no shift to a significant increase. Nicaragua and
Panama are the two cases where the original  Gini increased, but after imputation of
missing incomes and taking zero’s at their face value the distribution remains unchanged.
                                                       
20 Brick and Kalton (1996), Kalton and Kasprzyk (1986), and Rubin (1987) review other methods for
dealing with missing values.19
In Paraguay, rather than having a sharp decline (although driven by a single outlier), there
is no statistically significant change.
3.3 Use of Different Indexes for Measuring Inequality
Undoubtedly the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality, but
there is a long list of equally acceptable alternative measures. The main difference is that
different measures apply different weights to different sections of the distribution (for
instance, the Gini applies more weight to the middle). The family of Generalized Entropy
Inequality measures (E) explained by Cowell and Jenkins (1995) are some of the most
transparent measures in the sense that they explicitly allow different weights to be
applied to different sections of the distribution through the choice of a simple
parameter.
21
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 show changes in inequality by using two members of the
entropy family of indexes: one that applies greater weight to changes at the lower tail of
the distribution (b@ -1), and another that applies more weight at the top (b@ 1). According
to these results, our conclusions on the change in inequality for Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela hold for either of these two indexes.
In the case of Brazil and Panama, the bottom-sensitive index declines while the top-
sensitive index and the Gini increases. Overall inequality measured by the Gini in these
countries increases because the improvements at the bottom are counterbalanced by the
greater concentration at the top of the distribution.
Perhaps the most interesting result is that, for five out of the six countries where the Gini
remains stable during the 1990s (see Figure 2), the use of an alternative index leads to the
conclusion that inequality actually increased. In Bolivia and Colombia the conclusion of
                                                       




where b is a parameter that can be assigned any real value, n x is the size of the population, and yi and mx are
the income of each individual, and the average income of population x, respectively. Specifying a high20
stability is reversed by the use of a bottom-sensitive index, while for Chile, Ecuador and
Mexico the top-sensitive index yields a deterioration in the distribution of income.
Thus, in 7 out of the 15 cases, our impression of changes in inequality depends on the
way in which we choose to summarize income distribution. In Table 5 we restrict the
choice of measure to only two entropy indexes,
22 but in Appendix Table A.3 we present
some other commonly used summary inequality measures. The first column shows the
income ratio of individuals at the top and bottom 10% of the distribution, respectively.
The second compares the top 10% with the bottom 30%, while the third compares the
richest and the poorest quintile. Interestingly, in 12 countries – including Chile,
Colombia, and Ecuador, where the Gini remains unchanged – the income gap between
the poorest and richest 10% expands. It only declines in Costa Rica, Mexico and
Paraguay (although in the latter country the result is driven by the outlier observation at
the top of the distribution), and in Mexico the reduction is only marginal. The differences
between the top 10% and bottom 30% expand in 11 countries, but the gap does not widen
as much as in the previous comparison. The same applies to the comparison of the top
and bottom quintile. The income gap expands in most cases, but the change is only
important in Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela.
For a more general approach we perform first order stochastic dominance tests with the
micro data to determine whether the whole distribution for the first year is
unambiguously more equal than the distribution for the last year available. The last
column in Table 3 shows the year that Lorenz dominates (is more equal) the distribution
of the current year (blank spaces indicate that there is no first order stochastic dominance
between the year in question and other year). The test is only performed for the end-
points for simplicity. In Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and
Uruguay, the Lorenz curves for the first and last years intersect at some point, so the
direction of the change in inequality is ambiguous. In the rest of the countries, the last
                                                                                                                                                                    
positive value yields an index that is more sensitive to redistributions at the upper tail of the distribution,
while a negative value yields indices attaching larger weights to changes at the lower tail.21
year is dominated by the first, so there is an unambiguous increase in inequality, although
the shift is not always statistically significant.
4. What is Driving the Changes?
This section explores what is driving the changes in inequality in Latin America during
the 1990s. First we analyze the role played by some specific socioeconomic groups, and
then we focus on the role of the different income sources. We stress that our objective is
not to explain the shifts, but rather to provide an idea about what aspects of the data are
driving the lack of distributive progress.
4.1  Are the Changes Due to Greater Concentration Among
the Rich?
We are especially interested in determining which parts of the distribution have been
shifting in Latin America in the 1990s because theoretically it is not clear if, after periods
of macroeconomic instability and economic reform, there are specific groups of the
population  who are better able to take advantage of the opportunities that are being
generated. To examine this issue, we first focus on the influence of the richest sectors of
the population and, secondly, we try to establish the effect of other groups characterized
by their schooling.
A simple way to verify if the lack of distributive progress is due to a concentration of
resources among the richest individuals is to re-compute the  Gini coefficient by
truncating the distribution at the top.
23 Specifically, we estimate inequality by excluding
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 In fact, we computed the entropy measures with a wide variety of values for the parameter a. We only
present the cases for b @ 1 and b @ -1 here because these are enough to make the point that different
measures may lead to different conclusions.
23  The standard way to measure the influence on a change in inequality of  a  certain  portion of the
population is to classify the population according to certain personal characteristic and to decompose the
change in inequality into the effect of the redistribution within and between groups, respectively, and the
effect of population shifts from one group to another  (see, for instance, Mokerjee and Shorrocks (1982).
We do not use this method here because we are interested in one very specific subgroup.22
the richest 10 households, the richest 1% of the population, the richest 2%, the richest 5%
and the richest 10%, respectively, and verify if the direction and magnitude of the
distributive shift is similar to the results in Table 2. Table 4 presents the results.
In Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela, truncating
the distribution at the richest 10% or above does not make much of a difference. The
change in inequality in these cases is practically the same as in Table 2. In the last four
countries there is a raise in the Gini, which is therefore caused by shifts among the first 9
deciles of the population.
In six out of the remaining eight countries, changes in inequality in the 1990s are strongly
influenced by the greater concentration among the richest 10% of the population. For
instance, in Brazil and Peru the increase in inequality documented in Table 2 is mainly
due to the income gains of centiles 90 to 95. We arrive at this conclusion because when
truncating the distribution at the top 10% there is a much smaller deterioration. But if the
distribution is truncated at the top 5% the increase is much more considerable and very
similar to the change in Table 2. In Nicaragua and Panama the situation is similar,
although the income concentration that drives the increase in inequality is observed at
centiles 95 to 98. The shifts in Mexico and Paraguay have the same features, although the
main distributive effect is observed higher in the distribution. In Mexico, inequality
among the first 98  centiles declined in a statistically significant way, but the greater
concentration among the richest 2% resulted in no change in the overall distribution. The
case of Paraguay is already documented in Figure 3. Excluding the highest observation in
this survey changes the conclusion about the evolution of inequality. Table 4 confirms
this.
Londoño and  Székely (2000) find that most of the increases in inequality in Latin
America during the 1980s are precisely due to a higher concentration at the top decile.
Therefore, the results for these six countries can be regarded as a continuation of the
trend.23
In the remaining two countries,  Ecuador and Colombia,   the top 10% also has a
significant influence on changes over time, but in these cases the dynamics are quite the
opposite. In Ecuador, the overall Gini does not change, but if the distribution is truncated
at the 95
th centile, the conclusion would be that inequality increased. Thus, the change in
income among the two richest  centiles actually contributed to improve the overall
distribution. Colombia is a similar case. Truncating the distribution below the ten richest
households results in a considerable increase in the  Gini. After including these
households in the computation, the Gini presents no statistically significant shift.
As already mentioned, it is common in developed countries to truncate the distribution at
the top (generally the top 1%) and exclude it from the sample, because extreme incomes
are regarded as less reliable. The main reason is that even if the richest individuals were
willing to report all their income, it is difficult to determine their size with precision
because they are usually derived from a variety of assets. Therefore, the first two columns
in Table 4 could also be interpreted as an exercise where some of the observations that
are suspected of having larger measurement error are excluded from the sample. The Gini
with this truncation could be regarded as a “cleaner” comparison across countries. Under
this interpretation, the first two columns of Table 4 would lead  us  to change our
impression about how inequality has shifted in the 1990s in Chile, Colombia and
Paraguay. Rather than having no change and a significant decline, respectively, we have a
raise in the first two countries and no change in the third.
Are the Changes Due to More Concentration Among the Most Educated?
Another way of looking at the influence of specific subgroups is to divide the population
according to years of schooling rather than by the position in the income distribution.
This has an advantage in that most individuals in Latin America do not continue their
formal schooling after age 20 and it is therefore possible to roughly follow about the
same group of individuals across surveys.
24 Table 5 presents our estimations by
                                                       
24 There will be changes in composition due to the incorporation of individuals formerly below 20 in the
first survey, but since we are not looking at long periods of time, these composition effects are not expected
to be strong.24
excluding different groups of individuals at the top of the schooling (rather than the
income) distribution. The first column excludes individuals over 20 years of age with at
least 20 years of formal schooling (typically these individuals at least have post-graduate
education). The second column excludes individuals with 18 years or more (with at least
a college degree), the third column truncates the schooling distribution at 15 years (some
college education), while the last column refers to the  Gini index computed for
individuals with at least 12 years (some post-secondary). The change in overall inequality
is the result of the inequality within the group we are considering (those below each
schooling threshold), plus the inequality among those in the subgroup excluded from the
calculation, plus the inequality due to the difference in average income between the two
groups. In Table 5 we are only considering the distribution within the specific group
below the threshold.
In Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, the
conclusion about the magnitude of the change in inequality remains practically
unchanged after truncating the schooling distribution. In Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua
and Uruguay, excluding all individuals with more than 14 years of school would lead to
the conclusion that inequality declined in the first two (rather than remaining constant),
and remained constant (rather than increasing) in the other two. Thus, the subgroup of
individuals with more than 14 years of schooling exacerbates inequality. Their inclusion
cancels out the improvements in the distribution among individuals with less education.
In Chile and Panama, the same effect is observed but for individuals with more than 17
years of schooling. In Mexico, excluding all individuals with less than 19 years would
lead to the conclusion that there was a significant decline in the Gini index. Thus, the
dynamics among the most highly educated are driving the lack of progress in distribution.
4.2  Which Income Sources are Behind the Changes?
Now we ask which types of income sources have been behind the changes in inequality.
We have already presented some information on this in Table 2, but to provide a more25
precise idea of the contribution of each source, we apply the decomposition suggested by
Székely (1998). This method allows us to identify the effect that changes in the
distribution within each source and changes in the factor shares have on total inequality.
25
Table 6 presents the decomposition of the change between the first and the last year
available for each country (Bolivia is excluded because all effects are negligible). We
divide total income into four different sources: labor income for employees, labor income
for the self-employed, non-labor income, and non-monetary income. The split of labor
income into self-employment and employees is because presumably, one of the effects of
economic reform is the creation of market opportunities, which could be reflected in a
surge in self-employment.
In all cases but El Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay, the factor share effect, which
accounts for changes in the relative weight of each income source, plays a minor role in
the change in income distribution. In Honduras and Paraguay, the main effect is that the
relative importance of labor income from self-employment increased during the 1990s.
Since this source has a more unequal distribution than labor income for employees, the
shift has a positive contribution to the increase in inequality. A similar situation arises in
Mexico and Uruguay, although the factor share effect is much smaller. In the case of El
Salvador most of the effect is driven by the increase in the importance of labor incomes
for employees. The share of labor income for the self-employed also increased, and since
these sources have a less egalitarian distribution the change contributes to increased
inequality.
In all cases but El Salvador and Venezuela, there is a deterioration in the distribution of
labor incomes for employees, which accounts for a major inequality increasing effect.
                                                       
25 The decomposition consists on expressing a change in inequality as:
k i k k i k I I I D + D = D ￿ ￿ = = 1 1 b b
where I is overall inequality, Ik is inequality within source k and bk is the income share of source k. The
first term on the right hand side of the equation is the “factor share effect,” while the second term is the
“inequality effect.” The equation is derived from Shorrocks (1982) and provides an exact decomposition
that can be applied equally well to any inequality measure.26
There is also a strong inequality-reducing effect from the improvement in the distribution
of labor income from the self-employed (two exceptions are Nicaragua and Colombia,
where both effects are positive). These two shifts may be responding to the same
incentives. The inequality-increasing effect may be reflecting a rise in the return to skills,
while the negative effect from the self-employed may be associated with a displacement
of individuals with relatively high incomes and education, who might have shifted toward
the jobs with the highest remuneration among employees.
Non-labor incomes have had un-equalizing effects in all countries except for El Salvador
and Venezuela. In these cases, the factor share and the inequality effect have contributed
to reducing inequality, but the effect has been totally counterbalanced by the regressive
effects of labor incomes from employees  (and labor incomes from self-employment in El
Salvador). In the rest of the countries, non-labor incomes have been part of the reason
why inequality has failed to decline in the 1990s. It should be stressed, however, that
non-labor incomes tend to be captured with lower precision than labor income. So, part of
the reason why this source does not play a predominant role may simply be that
household surveys are not able to register them appropriately.
Only five countries in the Table have information for non-monetary incomes, and even
among these few cases there are differences in the definition of this source.
26 In
Colombia and Uruguay these sources have had a modest contribution to the increase in
inequality, while in Chile and Peru they have been an important cause for the shift. In
Mexico, non-monetary incomes have had a modest contribution in reducing inequality.
In sum, there is not a very clear pattern about the role that different income sources play
over the changes in inequality. The only regularity is a substantial contribution of labor
incomes of employees to the increase in inequality. This is to some extent
counterbalanced by the improvement in the distribution of labor incomes from self-
employment.
                                                       
26 Specifically, in some cases only income in kind is included, while in others gifts and imputed rents are
also accounted for.27
5. Conclusions
This paper uses 49 household surveys from 15 Latin America countries in order to
explore what has happened to inequality during the 1990s. We restrict the comparison to
the countries that have data that is representative at the national level, and to household
surveys that are strictly comparable over time. This limits the number of countries and
years, but there are two important advantages. First, since the surveys are national, we are
sure that our conclusions apply practically to the whole population of each country, rather
than to restricted subgroups, as is the case with surveys that only have urban coverage.
Second, comparability assures that our conclusions refer to genuine distributive shifts,
and not to “artificial” variation introduced by differences in the survey methodology over
time.
We can confidently say that in the 15 countries where comparable national household
surveys are available, income distribution has not improved in the 1990s. There are five
cases – El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela – where inequality has
definitely increased sharply. In 3 other cases, the  Gini coefficient estimated in a
conventional way also shows a statistically significant rise, but if inequality is measured
with alternative inequality indexes (for Brazil and Panama), or economies of scale in
consumption are allowed for (in Uruguay), inequality declines or remains constant.
There are six countries where there is no statistically significant shift in the Gini during
the 1990s, when the coefficient is estimated in the standard way. However, if rather than
discarding missing and zero incomes – which is quite standard in Latin America but not
in other regions – we impute missing values and take zero incomes at their face value, the
Gini for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador presents a statistically significant increase
instead of remaining stable. Mexico is another case where there is apparently no shift, but
if rather than using the Gini, a top-sensitive inequality index is employed, the conclusion
is that there is a considerable deterioration in distribution. Costa Rica is the only country28
among these six where the conclusion  of no shift during the 1990s is robust to the
different ways of treating the data.
The only country where at first glance there is a reduction in inequality in the 1990s is
Paraguay. But this conclusion is totally driven by one outlier observation (among the
sample of about 22,000) in the 1995 data, with implausibly high incomes. This outlier
drives up the Gini for 1995, so when it is compared with 1998 it gives the impression of a
substantial improvement in income distribution. Once this observation – which is perhaps
better regarded as “contamination” in the data – is dropped, the conclusion is that there is
no statistically significant change in this country as well.
Although consistency within each country is guaranteed by the use of strictly comparable
surveys, there are still considerable differences across countries in the characteristics of
household surveys. All of them include information for labor incomes, but there is wide
variety in the coverage of other sources. If the comparison is restricted to the minimum
common denominator (labor incomes), the conclusion is that inequality increased in 11
cases and remained unchanged in only 3. In Paraguay there is still a decline, but it is
totally driven by the one outlier observation.
What is driving the lack of distributive progress? In Colombia and Ecuador the reason is
that inequality among the first 98 centiles increased; the lower concentration among the
richest 2% actually counterbalanced this effect, and this is why there is no shift overall.
In Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela,
the lack of progress is caused by an increase in inequality among the first 9 deciles of the
population. In contrast, in Brazil and Peru the increase is driven by the income gains of
centiles 90 to 95. In Nicaragua and Panama, the income concentration at centiles 95- 98
is the main force behind the increase, while in Mexico and Paraguay the lack of
improvement is driven by income gains among the richest 2% of the population.
In terms of education groups, in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela the lack of progress cannot be attributed to the income29
gains of the most educated individuals. But in Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
Chile, Panama and Mexico, the dynamics among individuals with 14 years or more of
schooling are the main reason why income distribution has not improved in the 1990s.
As for income sources, the main force driving the lack of distributive progress is the
deterioration in the distribution of labor incomes.
Does this mean that we should not expect major improvements in distribution in other
regions, such as Eastern Europe, where countries have macro conditions similar to those
of Latin America in the 1980s? Or that it is likely that the distribution will worsen in East
Asia after the recent financial crisis, and that the trends will persist even with more stable
macroeconomic conditions? When Latin America is compared internationally it turns out
that, with few exceptions, inequality has increased less than in developed countries and
Eastern Europe. But still, the evidence presented here leads us to think that the answer to
these questions might be yes.30
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Figure 3
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          Changes in Income Inequality Around the World in the 1990s
Yearly Chg Yearly Chg Change Gini Gini
(%) (Gini Points) (Gini Points) Year 2 Year 1 Years Country
0.230 0.001 0.001 0.5890 0.5877 (1996,1997) Bolivia
3.114 0.018 0.018 0.5906 0.5728 (1992,1996) Brazil
0.439 0.002 0.017 0.5638 0.5470 (1990,1996) Chile
0.022 0.000 0.001 0.5679 0.5670 (1991,1998) Colombia
-0.015 -0.000 -0.001 0.4589 0.4595 (1989,1997) Costa Rica
0.009 0.000 0.000 0.5601 0.5600 (1995,1998) Ecuador
3.559 0.018 0.054 0.5589 0.5050 (1995,1998) El Salvador
0.504 0.003 0.017 0.5876 0.5704 (1989,1998) Honduras
-0.088 -0.000 -0.003 0.5276 0.5309 (1989,1996) Mexico
1.252 0.007 0.035 0.6024 0.5669 (1993,1998) Nicaragua
0.385 0.002 0.013 0.5755 0.5625 (1991,1997) Panama
-2.746 -0.017 -0.051 0.5692 0.6203 (1995,1998) Paraguay 
1.479 0.007 0.041 0.5055 0.4643 (1991,1997) Peru
0.967 0.004 0.024 0.4300 0.4064 (1989,1997) Uruguay
2.761 0.013 0.026 0.4963 0.4703 (1995,1997) Venezuela
0.792 0.004 0.013 Avg. Latin America
0.411 0.001 0.004 0.3544 0.3501 (1991,1994) Canada
1.987 0.008 0.025 0.4404 0.4157 (1991,1994) USA
1.199 0.005 0.015 Avg. N. America
0.558 0.002 0.011 0.3915 0.3809 (1989,1994) Australia
1.606 0.004 0.018 0.2918 0.2742 (1991,1995) Finland
0.188 0.001 0.003 0.3427 0.3395 (1989,1994) France
1.213 0.004 0.020 0.3464 0.3266 (1989,1994) Germany
4.136 0.013 0.051 0.3621 0.3107 (1991,1995) Italy
-0.005 -0.000 -0.000 0.2694 0.2694 (1991,1994) Luxembourg
1.119 0.004 0.011 0.3366 0.3256 (1991,1994) Neatherlands
0.450 0.001 0.005 0.2935 0.2883 (1991,1995) Norway
0.538 0.002 0.005 0.2885 0.2839 (1992,1995) Sweden
0.439 0.002 0.007 0.3966 0.3898 (1991,1995) United Kingdom
1.158 0.004 0.015 Avg. Western Europe
5.178 0.015 0.045 0.3320 0.2874 (1991,1994) Hungary
5.122 0.017 0.050 0.3749 0.3250 (1992,1995) Poland
0.915 0.004 0.012 0.4525 0.4404 (1992,1995) Russia
3.738 0.012 0.036 Avg. Eastern Europe
-2.058 -0.011 -0.046 0.5129 0.5589 (1992,1996) Thailand
-0.180 -0.001 -0.002 0.3027 0.3049 (1991,1995) Taiwan
-1.119 -0.006 -0.024 Avg. Eastern Europe
Source: Authors' calculations from household survey data. The results for Latin American countries
were obtained with direct access to household surveys detailed in the Appendix. The results for Thailand 
were obtained  by processing the Socio-Economic Survey. Household surveys for the rest of the
countries wree accessed through the Luxembourg Income Study.35
Table 2
Inequality with Differences in Coverage
% Urban Urb/Rur          Gini Index Gini Labor Conventional Year Country
Population Ratio Rural Urban Incomes Gini
0.60 3.50 0.6134 0.5177 0.5805 0.5877 1996 Bolivia
0.63 3.04 0.6745 0.5292 0.5866 0.5890 1997 Bolivia
0.78 2.83 0.5380 0.5512 0.5809 0.5728 1992 Brazil
0.78 2.62 0.5780 0.5755 0.6064 0.5952 1993 Brazil
0.79 3.00 0.5364 0.5695 0.5991 0.5911 1995 Brazil
0.79 2.97 0.5470 0.5691 0.5965 0.5906 1996 Brazil
0.81 1.34 0.5742 0.5370 0.5587 0.5470 1990 Chile
0.81 1.84 0.4719 0.5161 0.5428 0.5220 1992 Chile
0.83 1.92 0.5097 0.5499 0.5767 0.5558 1994 Chile
0.84 2.30 0.5006 0.5546 0.5845 0.5638 1996 Chile
0.58 1.93 0.6210 0.5043 0.5694 0.5670 1991 Colombia
0.58 2.76 0.5580 0.5634 0.6088 0.6038 1993 Colombia
0.60 0.93 0.6080 0.5342 0.5808 0.5697 1995 Colombia
0.61 3.04 0.5022 0.5423 0.5783 0.5758 1997 Colombia
0.61 2.18 0.5660 0.5295 0.5880 0.5679 1998 Colombia
0.44 1.77 0.4256 0.4431 0.4526 0.4595 1989 Costa Rica
0.44 1.58 0.4449 0.4332 0.4605 0.4598 1991 Costa Rica
0.44 1.65 0.4333 0.4336 0.4509 0.4550 1993 Costa Rica
0.44 1.72 0.4374 0.4292 0.4582 0.4571 1995 Costa Rica
0.43 1.71 0.4270 0.4367 0.4581 0.4589 1997 Costa Rica
0.59 2.75 0.4890 0.5285 0.5672 0.5600 1995 Ecuador
0.58 2.53 0.5376 0.5188 0.5627 0.5601 1998 Ecuador
0.55 2.62 0.4283 0.4639 0.5120 0.5050 1995 El Salvador
0.55 2.97 0.4454 0.4797 0.5195 0.5195 1997 El Salvador
0.58 2.87 0.5413 0.4905 0.5432 0.5589 1998 El Salvador
0.33 2.91 0.4984 0.5269 0.5715 0.5704 1989 Honduras
0.42 2.36 0.4956 0.5153 0.5489 0.5489 1992 Honduras
0.44 2.29 0.4817 0.4917 0.5302 0.5284 1996 Honduras
0.44 2.22 0.6065 0.5356 0.5947 0.5876 1998 Honduras
0.62 2.46 0.4576 0.5201 0.5408 0.5309 1989 Mexico
0.59 2.83 0.4535 0.5021 0.5671 0.5341 1992 Mexico
0.58 2.83 0.4403 0.5018 0.5669 0.5361 1994 Mexico
0.59 3.02 0.4560 0.4892 0.5800 0.5276 1996 Mexico
0.56 3.03 0.5441 0.5305 0.5669 0.5669 1993 Nicaragua
0.54 2.79 0.5605 0.5779 0.6027 0.6024 1998 Nicaragua
0.53 2.74 0.5512 0.5127 0.5355 0.5625 1991 Panama
0.59 3.14 0.5321 0.5147 0.5466 0.5602 1995 Panama
0.60 2.75 0.5507 0.5287 0.5678 0.5755 1997 Panama
0.51 3.09 0.5664 0.5726 0.6267 0.6203 1995 Paraguay
0.54 3.48 0.5458 0.5103 0.5662 0.5692 1998 Paraguay
0.77 2.81 0.4139 0.4294 0.4917 0.4643 1991 Peru
0.70 2.45 0.4478 0.4487 0.5003 0.4832 1994 Peru
0.65 3.15 0.4330 0.4484 0.5301 0.5055 1997 Peru
0.4064 0.4461 0.4064 1989 Uruguay
0.4319 0.4562 0.4319 1992 Uruguay
0.4209 0.4683 0.4209 1995 Uruguay
0.4300 0.4792 0.4300 1997 Uruguay
0.82 1.71 0.4346 0.4634 0.4664 0.4703 1995 Venezuela
0.4963 0.4951 0.4963 1997 Venezuela
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.36
Table 3
Robustness Tests to Methodological Preferences
Dominance Entropy inequality Missing and Zero values Adult Economies Year Country
        Measures Gini with (%) of equivalence of scale
Tests* a=+1 a=-1 imputation all obs. scale in consump.
0.688 3.433 0.5987 8.0 0.5670 0.5682 1996 Bolivia
-- 0.699 3.655 0.6242 11.2 0.5686 0.5699 1997 Bolivia
0.653 2.640 0.5809 3.9 0.5522 0.5655 1992 Brazil
0.726 2.175 0.6073 4.0 0.5759 0.5882 1993 Brazil
0.692 1.363 0.6015 3.3 0.5700 0.5840 1995 Brazil
-- 0.685 1.342 0.6005 4.3 0.5712 0.5839 1996 Brazil
0.608 0.998 0.5470 0.4 0.5329 0.5423 1990 Chile
0.559 0.810 0.6310 5.2 0.5043 0.5169 1992 Chile
0.597 0.890 0.5560 0.6 0.5397 0.5504 1994 Chile
-- 0.656 1.045 0.5637 0.2 0.5358 0.5578 1996 Chile
0.837 1.241 0.5654 4.6 0.5460 0.5425 1991 Colombia
0.989 1.394 0.6033 1.0 0.5854 0.5791 1993 Colombia
0.686 1.058 0.5826 5.6 0.5535 0.5489 1995 Colombia
0.854 1.556 0.5757 1.5 0.5540 0.5479 1997 Colombia
1991 0.721 2.638 0.5774 2.3 0.5425 0.5437 1998 Colombia
0.384 0.766 0.4599 13.6 0.4391 0.4519 1989 Costa Rica
0.389 0.706 0.4632 25.8 0.4361 0.4532 1991 Costa Rica
0.376 0.745 0.4569 24.7 0.4338 0.4479 1993 Costa Rica
0.380 0.713 0.4646 18.6 0.4366 0.4499 1995 Costa Rica
-- 0.381 0.628 0.4617 16.8 0.4352 0.4332 1997 Costa Rica
0.164 1.792 0.5600 1.9 0.5401 0.5269 1995 Ecuador
1995 0.494 1.940 0.5750 4.0 0.5497 0.5305 1998 Ecuador
0.309 0.963 0.5219 0.7 0.4800 0.4732 1995 El Salvador
0.457 0.705 0.5817 16.5 0.4983 0.4867 1997 El Salvador
1995 0.523 2.540 0.5587 7.9 0.5425 0.5362 1998 El Salvador
0.647 1.018 0.5691 9.8 0.5453 0.5401 1989 Honduras
0.586 1.113 0.5688 9.0 0.5252 0.5407 1992 Honduras
0.565 0.831 0.5482 9.1 0.5056 0.5203 1996 Honduras
1992 0.669 2.539 0.5932 7.4 0.5698 0.5825 1998 Honduras
0.525 0.806 0.5309 0.1 0.5016 0.5280 1989 Mexico
0.573 0.768 0.5341 0.0 0.5116 0.5310 1992 Mexico
0.573 0.756 0.5361 0.0 0.5088 0.5258 1994 Mexico
-- 0.590 0.750 0.5300 0.0 0.4916 0.5300 1996 Mexico
0.643 2.286 0.6537 22.6 0.5464 0.5385 1993 Nicaragua
1993 0.683 2.567 0.6503 14.4 0.5684 0.5742 1998 Nicaragua
0.591 2.098 0.5882 6.5 0.5438 0.5547 1991 Panama
0.590 1.968 0.5857 6.3 0.5387 0.5523 1995 Panama
-- 0.640 1.820 0.5832 7.1 0.5543 0.5686 1997 Panama
1998 1.015 1.634 0.6200 1.9 0.5936 0.5876 1995 Paraguay
0.978 3.687 0.6135 7.2 0.5482 0.5450 1998 Paraguay
0.408 0.606 0.4643 0.0 0.4411 0.4568 1991 Peru
0.452 0.712 0.4832 0.0 0.4540 0.4747 1994 Peru
1991 0.500 0.799 0.5055 0.1 0.4791 0.4983 1997 Peru
0.251 0.375 0.4064 0.0 0.3843 0.3979 1989 Uruguay
0.282 0.477 0.4319 0.0 0.4085 0.4227 1992 Uruguay
0.267 0.444 0.4209 0.0 0.3966 0.4116 1995 Uruguay
1989 0.285 0.454 0.4300 0.0 0.4010 0.3906 1997 Uruguay
0.404 1.355 0.4676 11.6 0.4425 0.4613 1995 Venezuela
1995 0.468 1.470 0.5312 23.3 0.4722 0.4873 1997 Venezuela
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.
*Year which Lorenz dominates (is more equal than) the distribution of current year.37
Table 4
Inequality with Truncated Income Distribution
                 Excluding Year Country
Richest Richest Richest Richest Richest
10% 5% 2% 1% 10 hhs
0.4466 0.4837 0.5193 0.5384 0.5737 1996 Bolivia
0.4438 0.4791 0.5158 0.5370 0.5786 1997 Bolivia
0.4216 0.4634 0.5049 0.5262 0.5694 1992 Brazil
0.4276 0.4736 0.5188 0.5424 0.5921 1993 Brazil
0.4317 0.4781 0.5222 0.5447 0.5901 1995 Brazil
0.4375 0.4814 0.5240 0.5460 0.5891 1996 Brazil
0.3793 0.4290 0.4738 0.4958 0.5429 1990 Chile
0.3581 0.4010 0.4471 0.4719 0.5199 1992 Chile
0.3802 0.4250 0.4675 0.4906 0.5383 1994 Chile
0.3871 0.4347 0.4839 0.5110 0.5575 1996 Chile
0.3671 0.4037 0.4417 0.4630 0.5498 1991 Colombia
0.3880 0.4265 0.4654 0.4874 0.5889 1993 Colombia
0.3966 0.4421 0.4848 0.5070 0.5664 1995 Colombia
0.4034 0.4446 0.4851 0.5060 0.5512 1997 Colombia
0.3920 0.4377 0.4850 0.5094 0.5544 1998 Colombia
0.3568 0.3866 0.4140 0.4287 0.4516 1989 Costa Rica
0.3538 0.3843 0.4126 0.4263 0.4497 1991 Costa Rica
0.3493 0.3802 0.4105 0.4251 0.4476 1993 Costa Rica
0.3488 0.3789 0.4079 0.4241 0.4517 1995 Costa Rica
0.3510 0.3822 0.4119 0.4273 0.4553 1997 Costa Rica
0.3983 0.4387 0.4803 0.5015 0.5379 1995 Ecuador
0.4124 0.4510 0.4917 0.5130 0.5471 1998 Ecuador
0.3655 0.3998 0.4364 0.4582 0.4938 1995 El Salvador
0.3830 0.4180 0.4524 0.4718 0.5078 1997 El Salvador
0.4385 0.4691 0.5017 0.5186 0.5480 1998 El Salvador
0.4092 0.4544 0.4993 0.5227 0.5635 1989 Honduras
0.4062 0.4432 0.4809 0.5024 0.5435 1992 Honduras
0.3868 0.4218 0.4557 0.4760 0.5175 1996 Honduras
0.4566 0.4893 0.5235 0.5435 0.5818 1998 Honduras
0.3671 0.4078 0.4494 0.4735 0.5236 1989 Mexico
0.3800 0.4241 0.4664 0.4892 0.5200 1992 Mexico
0.3740 0.4189 0.4646 0.4887 0.5295 1994 Mexico
0.3400 0.3900 0.4200 0.4600 0.5286 1996 Mexico
0.4229 0.4551 0.4938 0.5147 0.5521 1993 Nicaragua
0.4254 0.4634 0.5059 0.5308 0.5579 1998 Nicaragua
0.4454 0.4785 0.5098 0.5275 0.5556 1991 Panama
0.4302 0.4667 0.5046 0.5237 0.5555 1995 Panama
0.4389 0.4744 0.5112 0.5315 0.5698 1997 Panama
0.4288 0.4702 0.5119 0.5361 0.5736 1995 Paraguay
0.4567 0.4923 0.5244 0.5379 0.5559 1998 Paraguay
0.3509 0.3800 0.4095 0.4248 0.4479 1991 Peru
0.3620 0.3918 0.4215 0.4385 0.4695 1994 Peru
0.3684 0.4003 0.4375 0.4589 0.4938 1997 Peru
0.3046 0.3316 0.3570 0.3696 0.3934 1989 Uruguay
0.3270 0.3564 0.3859 0.4010 0.4263 1992 Uruguay
0.3250 0.3540 0.3810 0.3942 0.4189 1995 Uruguay
0.3252 0.3561 0.3846 0.3989 0.4246 1997 Uruguay
0.3529 0.3841 0.4150 0.4317 0.4673 1995 Venezuela
0.3706 0.4051 0.4386 0.4560 0.4897 1997 Venezuela
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.38
Table 5
Inequality by Excluding Education Groups
         Excluding Year Country
Years of Years of Years of Years of
educ>11 educ>14 educ>17 educ>19
0.5599 0.5682 0.5882 0.5882 1996 Bolivia
0.5620 0.5677 0.5913 0.5913 1997 Bolivia
0.5377 0.5452 0.5690 0.5702 1992 Brazil
0.5565 0.5648 0.5912 0.5930 1993 Brazil
0.5477 0.5562 0.5868 0.5887 1995 Brazil
0.5506 0.5576 0.5860 0.5884 1996 Brazil
0.5268 0.5266 0.5415 0.5472 1990 Chile
0.4852 0.4872 0.5099 0.5220 1992 Chile
0.5075 0.5270 0.5492 0.5566 1994 Chile
0.5296 0.5349 0.5554 0.5634 1996 Chile
0.5468 0.5497 0.5699 0.5708 1991 Colombia
0.5673 0.5717 0.6037 0.6069 1993 Colombia
0.5562 0.5564 0.5703 0.5714 1995 Colombia
0.5426 0.5469 0.5760 0.5793 1997 Colombia
0.5235 0.5317 0.5633 0.5707 1998 Colombia
0.4383 0.4445 0.4573 0.4590 1989 Costa Rica
0.4379 0.4464 0.4571 0.4614 1991 Costa Rica
0.4318 0.4372 0.4507 0.4542 1993 Costa Rica
0.4286 0.4370 0.4542 0.4569 1995 Costa Rica
0.4289 0.4381 0.4567 0.4590 1997 Costa Rica
0.5316 0.5431 0.5560 0.5629 1995 Ecuador
0.5199 0.5367 0.5492 0.5606 1998 Ecuador
0.4631 0.4828 0.5039 0.5044 1995 El Salvador
0.4841 0.4952 0.5191 0.5202 1997 El Salvador
0.5367 0.5462 0.5572 0.5578 1998 El Salvador
0.5296 0.5513 0.5645 0.5723 1989 Honduras
0.5114 0.5323 0.5437 0.5507 1992 Honduras
0.4913 0.5077 0.5243 0.5295 1996 Honduras
0.5869 0.5841 0.5857 0.5865 1998 Honduras
0.5056 0.5126 0.5352 0.5355 1989 Mexico
0.5032 0.5139 0.5383 0.5383 1992 Mexico
0.4871 0.5035 0.5329 0.5328 1994 Mexico
0.4668 0.4881 0.4983 0.5143 1996 Mexico
0.5584 0.5598 0.5669 0.5669 1993 Nicaragua
0.5504 0.5542 0.5909 0.5909 1998 Nicaragua
0.5364 0.5444 0.5558 0.5621 1991 Panama
0.5270 0.5291 0.5474 0.5555 1995 Panama
0.5430 0.5300 0.5544 0.5720 1997 Panama
0.6048 0.6080 0.6117 0.6203 1995 Paraguay
0.5376 0.5376 0.5383 0.5383 1998 Paraguay
0.4368 0.4404 0.4583 0.4584 1991 Peru
0.4439 0.4518 0.4785 0.4806 1994 Peru
0.4633 0.4706 0.5003 0.5025 1997 Peru
0.3905 0.3952 0.3992 0.3992 1989 Uruguay
0.4105 0.4161 0.4255 0.4306 1992 Uruguay
0.3969 0.4043 0.4143 0.4196 1995 Uruguay
0.3982 0.4082 0.4207 0.4251 1997 Uruguay
0.4457 0.4537 0.4702 0.4706 1995 Venezuela
0.4644 0.4693 0.4841 0.4863 1997 Venezuela
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.39
Table 6
                       Decomposition of the Change in Inequality by Income Source
(%) Contribution by Source Total Effect Country
Non- Non-Labor Labor Labor
Monetary Income Income Income
Income Self-emp Employees
-1.3 -16.5 23.2 5.5 Factor share effect Brazil
42.9 -43.4 95.1 94.5 Inequality Effect
41.6 -59.9 118.3 100 Total
17.8 13.7 -11.2 -15.7 4.6 Factor share effect Chile
28.6 28.3 -13.1 51.6 95.4 Inequality Effect
46.3 42.0 -24.3 35.9 100 Total
0.2 -3.3 2.2 -2.2 -3.1 Factor share effect Colombia
0.0 52.3 19.2 31.5 103.1 Inequality Effect
0.2 49.0 21.5 29.3 100 Total
-19.3 -13.1 39.0 6.6 Factor share effect Costa Rica
19.5 -104.3 178.2 93.4 Inequality Effect
0.2 -117.4 217.2 100 Total
0.0 21.6 -20.0 -161.3 -159.7 Factor share effect Ecuador
4.6 49.7 -224.1 429.6 259.7 Inequality Effect
4.6 71.2 -244.1 268.3 100 Total
-15.2 12.6 20.9 18.3 Factor share effect El Salvador
-9.6 95.0 -3.8 81.7 Inequality Effect
-24.8 107.6 17.2 100 Total
-5.4 115.2 -77.0 32.9 Factor share effect Honduras
-5.4 -59.3 131.8 67.1 Inequality Effect
-10.7 55.9 54.8 100 Total
-4.2 0.7 4.1 -0.3 0.4 Factor share effect Mexico
-7.6 14.6 -42.0 134.6 99.6 Inequality Effect
-11.8 15.3 -37.9 134.4 100 Total
1.8 -2.6 -0.8 Factor share effect Nicaragua
92.0 8.8 100.8 Inequality Effect
93.7 6.3 100 Total
-6.9 -4.4 15.0 3.7 Factor share effect Panama
28.9 -20.8 88.2 96.3 Inequality Effect
22.0 -25.2 103.2 100 Total
-1.5 6.2 -22.8 -18.0 Factor share effect Paraguay
5.9 -3.7 115.8 118.0 Inequality Effect
4.4 2.5 93.0 100 Total
15.9 1.3 -0.8 -6.4 9.9 Factor share effect Peru
90.2 2.5 -13.8 11.2 90.1 Inequality Effect
106.1 3.8 -14.6 4.7 100 Total
5.7 -12.4 4.3 6.9 4.5 Factor share effect Uruguay
-1.1 5.2 -13.6 105.0 95.5 Inequality Effect
4.6 -7.2 -9.3 111.9 100 Total
-1.4 -4.3 7.0 1.3 Factor share effect Venezuela*
-30.7 112.5 -82.1 -0.3 Inequality Effect
-32.1 108.1 -75.1 1 Total
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.
*Results are divided by 100 due to the low value of the denominator.40
Appendix
Table A.1
Description of the Data
Country Year Name of the survey Coverage Month when  Reference
Survey was Held Month for Incomes
Bolivia 96 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo National June June
97 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo National November November
Brazil 92 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September September
93 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September September
95 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September September
96 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios National September September
Chile 90 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November October
92 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November October
94 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November October
96 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional National November October
Colombia 91 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National December November
93 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National September August
95 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National September August
97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National September August
98 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo National September August
Costa Rica 89 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July July
91 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July July
93 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July July
95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July July
97 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National July July
Ecuador 95 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida National August to November Depends, Prim. July-Sept.
98 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida National August to November Depends, Prim. July-Sept.
El Salvador 95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National 1995 1995
97 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National 1997 1997
98 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National May-Dec. May-Dec.
Honduras 89 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National September August
92 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National September August
96 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National September August
98 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples National March February
Mexico 89 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter Third quarter
92 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter Third quarter
94 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter Third quarter
96 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares National Third quarter Third quarter
Nicaragua 93 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida National February to June February to June
98 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida National April to September April to September
Panama 91 Encuesta Continua de Hogares - Mano de Obra National August Julio
95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  National August Julio
97 Encuesta de Hogares National August Julio
Paraguay 95 Encuesta de Hogares - Mano de Obra National August to November August to November
98 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares National Aug. 97 to July 98 Depends, prim Aug. to Jul. 
Peru 91 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida National September-November August-October
94 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida National May-August April-July
97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida National September-November August-October
Uruguay 89 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  Urban Second semester Second semester
92 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  Urban Second semester Second semester
95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  Urban 1995 1995
97 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  Urban 1997 1997
Venezuela 95 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra National Second semester Second semester
97 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra National Second semester Second semester41
Table A.2
Description of the Data
Precision of Survey Estimates Income
Year of Sample Sample Standard Sources
Sample Size Size as Error Covered
Country Year Frame (Num. Obs) % Total Gini
(Census) Population* Coeff. Labor Property Rent Capital Rent Transfers Non-Monetary Imputed Rent
Bolivia 96 1992 35,648 0.47 0.0080 X X X X n.a. n.a.
97 1992 36,752 0.47 0.0081 X X X X n.a. n.a.
Brazil 92 1991 317,145 0.21 0.0028 X X Xc X n.a. n.a.
93 1991 322,011 0.21 0.0030 X X Xc X n.a. n.a.
95 1991 334,106 0.21 0.0025 X X Xc X n.a. n.a.
96 1991 331,142 0.21 0.0025 X X Xc X n.a. n.a.
Chile 90 1982 105,189 0.80 0.0044 X Xb Xb Xb X X
92 1982 110,555 0.82 0.0038 X X X X X X
94 1982 178,057 1.27 0.0066 X Xb Xb Xb X X
96 1992 134,262 0.93 0.0042 X Xb Xb Xb X X
Colombia 91 1993 121,592 0.34 0.0066 X Xa Xa X Xe n.a.
93 1993 112,273 0.30 0.0094 X Xa Xa X Xe n.a.
95 1993 111,824 0.29 0.0052 X Xa Xa X Xe n.a.
97 1993 143,398 0.36 0.0568 X Xa Xa X X n.a.
98 1993 138,600 0.34 0.0100 X Xa Xa X X n.a.
Costa Rica 89 1984 34,368 1.16 0.0050 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
91 1984 35,565 1.13 0.0053 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
93 1984 37,703 1.12 0.0048 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
95 1984 40,613 1.14 0.0045 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
97 1984 41,277 1.10 0.0046 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 95 1990 26,941 0.24 0.0106 X X X X X X
98 1990 26,134 0.21 0.0087 X X X X n.a. n.a.
El Salvador 95 1992 40,004 0.71 0.0062 X Xb Xb Xb Xd X
97 1992 39,089 0.66 0.0070 X Xb Xb Xb Xd X
98 1992 56,766 0.94 0.0068 X Xb Xb Xb Xd X
Honduras 89 1988 46,672 0.98 0.0063 X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
92 1988 24,704 0.48 0.0081 X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
96 1988 33,172 0.57 0.0080 X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
98 1988 32,696 0.53 0.0075 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
Mexico 89 1980 57,289 0.07 0.0080 X X X X X X
92 1990 50,862 0.06 0.0059 X X X X X X
94 1990 60,402 0.07 0.0054 X X X X X X
96 1995 64,916 0.07 0.0052 X X X X X X
Nicaragua 93 1991 24,542 0.59 0.0092 X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
98 1995 23,637 0.49 0.0128 X n.a. n.a. n.a. X n.a.
Panama 91 1990 38,000 1.55 0.0062 X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
95 1990 40,320 1.53 0.0059 X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
97 1990 39,706 1.46 0.0067 X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
Paraguay 95 1992 21,910 0.45 0.0388 X X X X Xd n.a.
98 1992 20,664 0.40 0.0093 X X X X Xd Xd
Peru 91 1980 11,507 0.05 0.0096 X Xb Xb Xb X X
94 1993 18,662 0.08 0.0084 X Xb Xb Xb X X
97 1993 19,575 0.08 0.0085 X Xb Xb Xb X X
Uruguay 89 1985 31,766 1.03 0.0055 X X X X X X
92 1985 29,927 0.95 0.0049 X X X X X X
95 1985 64,930 2.02 0.0030 X X X X X X
97 1985 64,028 1.96 0.0031 X X X X X X
Venezuela 95 1990 92,450 0.42 0.0033 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
97 1990 76,965 0.34 0.0039 X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
*Total population taken from UN Population Statistics, 1998.
a. Can not separate between property and capital rent.
b. Can not separate other sources.
c. Can not separate capital rent from other sources
d. Can not separate nonmonetary income from labor income.42
Table A.3
Comparison of Income Shares of Different Deciles
Income Income share Top 20% vs Top 10% vs Top 10% vs year Country
share top 10% bottom 10% Bottom 20% Bottom 30% Bottom 10%
0.453 0.004 34.1 10.7 103.3 1996 Bolivia
0.456 0.004 34.9 10.7 114.6 1997 Bolivia
0.450 0.008 23.8 8.6 56.1 1992 Brazil
0.478 0.007 26.3 9.7 63.7 1993 Brazil
0.470 0.008 25.2 9.4 56.3 1995 Brazil
0.465 0.008 25.9 9.5 57.7 1996 Brazil
0.443 0.013 16.4 6.5 33.7 1990 Chile
0.417 0.016 13.0 5.2 25.5 1992 Chile
0.451 0.013 16.9 6.8 34.6 1994 Chile
0.460 0.013 17.9 7.2 36.8 1996 Chile
0.469 0.010 19.0 7.5 46.8 1991 Colombia
0.505 0.009 23.5 9.3 58.1 1993 Colombia
0.460 0.011 19.2 7.6 40.5 1995 Colombia
0.463 0.007 23.3 8.4 65.5 1997 Colombia
0.461 0.009 20.6 7.7 53.3 1998 Colombia
0.340 0.012 12.6 4.3 27.3 1989 Costa Rica
0.342 0.014 12.4 4.3 25.1 1991 Costa Rica
0.340 0.014 11.6 4.0 23.9 1993 Costa Rica
0.342 0.014 11.7 4.1 24.3 1995 Costa Rica
0.344 0.015 11.6 4.1 23.0 1997 Costa Rica
0.440 0.009 20.3 7.4 49.7 1995 Ecuador
0.438 0.006 24.4 8.1 74.6 1998 Ecuador
0.393 0.011 15.0 5.4 34.5 1995 El Salvador
0.398 0.011 16.2 5.9 35.3 1997 El Salvador
0.416 0.004 30.8 9.1 105.0 1998 El Salvador
0.455 0.010 20.6 7.9 44.2 1989 Honduras
0.425 0.009 20.1 7.3 44.8 1992 Honduras
0.409 0.012 16.5 6.2 34.0 1996 Honduras
0.446 0.004 37.1 11.4 100.8 1998 Honduras
0.436 0.013 15.8 6.3 32.9 1989 Mexico
0.432 0.013 16.4 6.4 33.3 1992 Mexico
0.431 0.013 16.0 6.3 32.4 1994 Mexico
0.441 0.014 17.3 7.0 31.7 1996 Mexico
0.438 0.007 24.9 8.6 63.2 1993 Nicaragua
0.486 0.007 28.5 10.3 73.6 1998 Nicaragua
0.418 0.005 29.8 9.0 83.0 1991 Panama
0.426 0.006 25.9 8.5 71.4 1995 Panama
0.441 0.006 28.0 9.2 74.4 1997 Panama
0.508 0.007 31.0 11.7 77.2 1995 Paraguay
0.367 0.010 17.0 5.5 38.3 1998 Paraguay
0.350 0.015 12.3 4.4 23.7 1991 Peru
0.297 0.007 18.3 4.8 40.5 1994 Peru
0.391 0.012 15.5 5.7 31.6 1997 Peru
0.309 0.021 8.3 3.0 14.7 1989 Uruguay
0.326 0.018 9.7 3.5 17.9 1992 Uruguay
0.314 0.019 9.3 3.3 16.7 1995 Uruguay
0.331 0.019 9.5 3.5 17.5 1997 Uruguay
0.356 0.015 12.3 4.4 24.3 1995 Venezuela
0.379 0.011 15.0 5.3 33.7 1997 Venezuela
Source: Authors'calculations from household survey data.